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IIIClimate security in the Central American Dry Corridor
The evidence on conflicts around the world since the turn of the century points to a simple 
conclusion: conflicts, grievances and insecurities are increasingly being affected by changing 
climates, environmental degradation, food insecurity, and the struggle to control a finite pool 
of natural resources.
This paper aims to understand the linkages between climate, conflict, agriculture, and 
migration in the Central American Dry Corridor and offer a road map for the region while 
emphasizing the role of research and development. We do this by first clarifying what climate 
security means and how it links to risk and resilience (introduction). We then present causal 
impact pathways to describe how climate exacerbates drivers of conflict and insecurity 
(Section 1). We continue with a social media and policy coherence analysis to explain how the 
linkages between climate and conflict are perceived by the public (Section 2) and represented 
in public policies (Section 3). We then describe the linkages between climate and security 
for Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (Section 4). This is followed by an overview of 
indicators summarizing the state of climate security in Central America and the Dry Corridor 
and a discussion of the limitations of such indicators (Section 5). We then present existing 
research for development efforts and discuss their potential to contribute to climate security 
by mitigating its drivers (Section 6). We offer entry points for improving climate security in 
the Central American Dry Corridor (Section 7) and finally, Section 8 proposes entry points for 
incorporating climate security dimensions into rural development and regional and national 

















IV Climate security in the Central American Dry Corridor
The paper shows that interconnected climate, security, and migration crises are being managed 
as separate challenges in the Central American Dry Corridor. Through well-targeted support 
that complements humanitarian, political, social, and security-focused solutions, agricultural 
research and development can help rural populations adapt to and mitigate climate change 
impacts, stabilize agriculture-based livelihoods, and increase peace and security. 
A spatial analysis of drivers of conflict demonstrates clearly that climate has the potential to 
exacerbate conflict, insecurity and migration. However, a social media and policy coherence 
analysis shows the disconnected discourses of climate and security both in the public discourse 
and in policies. The analysis of peace, security and climate risk indicators situates the Central 
American Dry Corridor countries vis-a-vis other countries globally and uncovers the disconnect 
among the indicators in terms of climate security, human wellbeing, and peace. In this 
fragmented context, we argue that investing in agriculture research and development, with its 
focus on enhancing resilience of agricultural production and rural livelihoods in response to 
climate change impacts, can contribute to reducing conflict and out-migration.
KEY MESSAGES
Key entry points for incorporating climate security dimensions into rural development and 
regional and national security policy and research agendas are:
• Foster inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral dialogue to overcome currently siloed perspectives, 
develop a shared understanding of problems, and agree on coordinated and joint actions.
• Leverage existing efforts to bring together a range of partners, to comprehensively quantify 
interrelated social, economic, and environmental challenges and business cases to target 
public and private sector investments, including in research.
• Build on existing regional networks and knowledge transfer platforms to re-think and re-
design community-based approaches that can effectively serve a range of interrelated 
objectives, including capacity development aspects.
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What is Climate Security and Why is it Important for the 
Central American Dry Corridor?
The changing climate is having severe negative impacts on livelihoods in developing countries. 
A key reason is that most economic and labor opportunities depend on the agricultural sector, 
which is increasingly affected by rising climate variability throughout the equatorial areas of 
the world (Beg et al. 2002; Campbell et al. 2016; Vermeulen et al. 2012). Some regions are 
especially prone to extreme climate events, among them the Central American Dry Corridor 
(CADC) (FAO 2017), where Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are projected to 
be more frequently affected by extreme precipitation variability and intense droughts (Stocker 
et al. 2013). 
The more frequently occurring droughts and floods in the CADC are posing a growing threat 
to internal food security (Imbach et al. 2017). In the words of the UN Secretary General, "The 
fallout of the assault on our planet” [i.e., increasing climate impacts] “is impeding our efforts 
to eliminate our poverty and imperiling food security" (United Nations 2020b). Growing food 
insecurity threatens peace. Without peace, there is no end to hunger. And without climate-
sensitive actions for peace and security, none of these efforts will succeed. Climate-related 
security risks manifest themselves when the impacts of climate change aggravate the drivers 
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To unpack the complex non-linearities of how aspects of climate and security relate, we begin 
with the premise that climate change is increasingly recognized as a “threat” or “risk multiplier”, 
with the potential to exacerbate effects of existing stresses and insecurities (Rüttinger et al. 
2015). This can be particularly relevant for contexts characterized by fragility, that is "periods 
of instability” that “emerge when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or 
legitimacy” to mitigate risks of violence (World Bank 2011). ; in other words, “the combination 
of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or communities 
to manage, absorb, and mitigate those risks” (Desai and Forsberg 2020).
Although there is a growing body of academic and grey literature examining the climate 
security nexus, there is no consensus on a holistic definition of climate security. We draw on the 
existing understandings to present a comprehensive conceptual framework of climate security 
that can be useful for a wide range of audiences and stakeholders, including researchers, 
policymakers, development practitioners, government officials, and humanitarian actors.
The idea of security has been framed in multiple ways and at multiple scales, including 
national and international security, human security and environmental security. Our climate 
security framework mainly attempts to draw from the human security framework, which 
centers on people rather than states as key actors. Instead of the traditional understanding of 
security as territorial and constructed around the nation-state, the human security approach 
recognizes the need to integrate “freedom from fear” with “freedom from want” and legitimize 
security concerns of ordinary people facing threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, 
political repression, environmental hazards and human rights abuse (Liotta and Owen 2006). 
Violent conflict can be one of the ways through which insecurity manifests itself in situations 
characterized by instability and fragility.
Climate-related security risks can be viewed as systemic risks that emerge through 
interactions between ecological, social and political economic dimensions. The interactions 
are “driven by one or more climatic stressors that directly and/or indirect impact human 
security and that challenge the peace and stability of states and societies” (Weathering Risk 
2020). Key components integral to a climate security framework  are: 1) climatic stressors 
and their impacts on systems (climate lens); 2) drivers and actors informing economic, social, 
and political stability and insecurity in specific contexts (conflict lens); 3) context-specific 
interactions between climate impacts and peace and insecurity risks (pathways); and 4) 
context-specific structural factors shaping climate-conflict vulnerabilities and resilience, 
including gender inequality and social stratification (cross-cutting themes). The report, ‘A New 
Climate for Peace’, identifies seven specific climate fragility risks (Rüttinger et al. 2015) . These 
climate fragility risks describe the potential pathways by which climate impacts may interact 
with local insecurities to produce conflict outcomes:
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• Local resource competition: When the pressure on natural resources increases, 
competition can lead to instability and even violent conflict in the absence of effective 
dispute resolution or resource sharing mechanisms. 
• Extreme weather events and disasters will exacerbate fragility challenges and can 
increase people’s vulnerability and grievances.
• Sea-level rise and coastal degradation threaten the viability of low-lying areas, potentially 
leading to social disruption, displacement and migration.
• Transboundary water management: Frequently a source of tensions, as demand grows 
and climate impacts affect quality and quantity, competition over water will increase 
pressure on existing governance structures.
• Unintended effects of climate policies: As climate adaptation policies are more broadly 
implemented, the risk of unintended negative side effects, particularly in conflict- fragile 
contexts, is increased.
• Volatile food prices and provision: Climate change is likely to disrupt food production in 
many regions, increasing prices and market volatility and thereby heightening the risk of 
protests, rioting, etc.
• Livelihood insecurity and migration: Climate change can increase the insecurity of 
people who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, which may push them to 
migrate or turn to illegal sources of income. 
Through these channels, climate impacts not only imperil food security, but can also trigger 
conflict, by compounding pre-existing sources of insecurity such as poverty, inequality and 
overall socio-political fragility (Koren and Bagozzi 2016). In the CADC, persistent extreme 
weather events and disasters, as well as long-term degradation, have given rise to compound 
fragility risks related to livelihood insecurity and attendant migration, local resource 
competition given the lack of resource sharing and dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as 
volatile food prices and food insecurity. These compounded risks have contributed to domestic 
and internal conflicts, such as gang violence, homicides, robberies and increasing participation 
in recruitment of armed groups that are endangering human security (Fogelbach 2011; Tellman 
et al. 2014). The main underlying drivers are economic instability and a lack of employment 
opportunities, loss of agricultural land, and lack of funding for education. The latter particularly 
affects local youth, increasing the likelihood that they are drawn into illegal groups and violent 
activities (Olate, Salas-Wright, and Vaughn 2012; Williams and Castellanos 2020). 
The interacting social, economic, and political effects of increasing climate variability also 
affect both the nature and rate of human mobility. Climate-related migration is the product of 
individual and household level decision-making, as well as larger group dynamics  (McLeman 
2018). The tipping point at which migration occurs – and the point at which migration rates 
become non-linear – are situated downstream from a number of other critical thresholds; 
those that individuals, households, and communities cross as they adjust to shifting climatic 
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conditions (Adger et al. 2009). Firstly, climatic shifts create a tipping point to which an adaptive 
response is required, where previously it was not. A second threshold occurs when such 
adaptive measures cease to have any beneficial effect. Finally, a third threshold occurs when 
the changed nature of the human-ecological relationship demands substantive changes in 
land use and/or livelihood strategies (Adger et al, 2009). McLeman (2018) identifies further 
thresholds specifically regarding migration: the first occurs when in situ adaptation is no 
longer possible and migration is the only valid adaptation option. Climate variability can give 
rise to reduced access to arable land, water shortages, decreased agricultural yields, and an 
associated loss of income and nutrition, thereby fundamentally undermining the viability 
of (rural) livelihoods. This can push people over a decision threshold. This threshold is the 
product of interactions between climate impacts and social, political, economic, and cultural 
processes. Whilst environmental hazards can act as a primary driver of migration, e.g., out-
migration due to environmental catastrophe (Naik 2009), individuals most commonly cite 
social and economic factors as reasons for migrating. Climate or environmental hazards rarely 
appear as the primary driver (Black et al. 2011; Null and Risi 2016). Climate impacts may 
combine with market vulnerabilities, for instance, to undermine the viability of livelihoods 
and cause unemployment, which in turn gives rise to a migratory threshold. 
The second tipping point (McLeman 2018) happens when migration rates themselves become 
non-linear. This is more readily apparent at the local scale and intimately related to the kind 
of climatic impacts a community is experiencing. A fast-onset climate disaster, for example, is 
likely to result in an immediate non-linear surge of movement, whereas slow-onset impacts 
exhibit significant time lags before migration rates become non-linear. This makes the influence 
of climate harder to empirically verify but does not mean it is absent. A third threshold occurs 
when migration rates cease to be non-linear, as migration group dynamics eventually cause 
rates to ebb. 
Migration undertaken as a result of climate factors is likely to feed into pre-existing systems 
of migration, while at the same time potentially creating new ones  (Ide 2020). In the Central 
American Dry Corridor, climate impacts are set to accelerate already ongoing socio-economic 
trends, such as permanent urbanization and people relying upon circular rural-urban 
migration. This has the potential to overwhelm already overstretched urban governance 
systems: demand for infrastructure and services in urban areas outpaces provision, thereby 
exacerbating pre-existing service deficiencies and housing scarcities (Rüttinger et al. 2015). 
Migrant populations often find their personal security undermined, as they are forced to accept 
employment in often unregulated and exploitative informal sectors. Stagnant economic and 
social conditions can also give rise to a variety of forms of unrest.
Adopting such a risk-based understanding invites us to consider how systems can become 
more resilient to climate fragility risks. At its simplest, resilience is the ability of a system to 
‘bounce back’ to its previously stable state, following an external shock (Chesterman, Neely, 
and Gosling 2020). However, deploying this rather narrow conceptualization may undermine 
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the very capacities that resilience building activities seek to create. Operationalizing the 
concept of resilience requires answering questions such as whose resilience, resilience to what 
and in which context and ‘who decides, basis on what value system?’  (Cote and Nightingale 
2012; Leach 2008).
A broad typology of resilience conceptualizations exists, defined differently depending on the 
actors involved, the scale at which resilience building is understood to take place, and the 
modalities under which it is undertaken. We apply the following taxonomy (Ferguson 2019; 
Methmann and Oels 2015): 
•     Absorptive capacity: Primarily, this is the ability of a system to bounce back to a previously 
stable state when subject to the impact of an exogenous shock. In the context of building 
resilience to climate shifts, this may include undertaking an early harvest to reduce food 
insecurity
•   Adaptive capacity: The ability of a system to adjust, modify, or change itself to mitigate 
future dangers. In terms of climate, this may include, for instance, the introduction of 
drought-resistant seeds. 
•  Transformative capacity: A system creates a fundamentally new system that is not 
susceptible, or at least less susceptible, to climate change impacts, by reorganizing itself at 
a fundamental level to reduce exposure, vulnerability, and susceptibility.
Resilience is essential to understanding how climate fragility risks, under specific conditions, 
may not only inform the climate-fragility-conflict nexus, but how the risks may relate to 
a possible climate-resilience-peace nexus. This risk-resilience framing integrates both a 
negative cycle, moving from fragility to vulnerability, human insecurity and potential for 
violent conflict, and a positive, or virtuous cycle, where stable and inclusive institutions 
can enhance a society’s resilience to generate pathways to human security and peace.  To 
realize and operationalize the double dividend of resilience in terms of climate change and 
peace, one needs to factor in context-specific complexities and socio-economic dynamics, 
overcome institutional and political barriers and communicate across thematic and regional 
silos. Adaptation efforts would then be peace-positive and development and peacebuilding 
initiatives climate-sensitive (Vivekananda, Schilling, and Smith 2014). 
This requires any planned activity to articulate what kind of resilience it is seeking to imbue, 
and in what way that type of resilience acts to mitigate both the immediate and long-term 
risks of conflict. Given how the drivers of climate-resilient peace (sustainability and resilience) 
are also those that underpin a positive peace (such as inclusive and accountable institutions), 
integrating a climate security-sensitive lens into CGIAR interventions would not only help 
ensure such interventions do no harm, but would also help articulate exactly how such 
interventions could contribute to the broader, system-wide transformation required to truly 
build climate resilience and contribute to a climate-resilient peace at scale. This brings us back 
to the questions, ‘resilience of what type, and for whom?’ and ‘who decides, basis on what value 
system?’  (Cote and Nightingale 2012; Leach 2008). 
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Can agricultural research for development (AR4D), which aims to support rural populations 
to adapt to and mitigate climate change impacts, contribute perspectives, knowledge and 
solutions to the peace and security research community and policymakers? How could these 
solutions become complementary components to humanitarian, political, social and security-
focused solutions? In recent years, scholars have been discussing the relationship between 
climate and conflict, confirming that with droughts and increased rainfall variability and 
a history of civil wars, communities are more susceptible to acts of violence (O’Loughlin et 
al. 2012; Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton 2015). These conditions have been strongly present in 
CADC, though research focusing specifically on the climate-food security-conflict nexus in this 
geographical area remains scarce (Adams et al. 2018). Many studies have focused on food 
security as one of the main drivers of conflict, (Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012; Hendrix and 
Brinkman 2013; Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019; Nordkvelle, Rustad, and Salmivalli 2017; 
Raleigh, Choi, and Kniveton 2015) leaving the question about the linkage between climate-
induced food insecurity and conflict unanswered. 
We see a major opportunity to combine insights from climate change literature and food 
security studies and demonstrate their relationship to the wider climate security nexus. But 
most actors, institutions and interest groups in the CADC do not consider climate and security 
as critically linked, thus treating them as separate, if complex challenges. This position paper 
shows that there are important linkages of food systems, climate, security and migration 
specific to the dry corridor, identifies entry points for policy and programming that aligns 
climate, food systems and peace objectives, and explains the role of agricultural research and 
development for promoting peace and security. 
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1. What are the Main Climate Security Impact Pathways in the 
Central American Dry Corridor?
The climate security impact pathways are informed by the climate fragility risks, as outlined 
in the introduction. These pathways visualize and map interactions of key variables and 
conditions by which a potential climate fragility risk is likely to emerge and play out in the 
CADC region. Operating within a risk-based framework, the pathways demonstrate how 
such interacting variables, conditions and characteristics, across a range of system (societal) 
dimensions and scales, may heighten the emergence of unstable, insecure and conflict-related 
outcomes. 
Central America is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate variability due to its geographic 
location, soil type, atmosphere dynamics, and terrain (Pachauri et al. 2007). The region is 
strongly affected by increasing temperatures, extreme drought, and destructive tropical storms, 
and Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua all rank within the top 50 countries 
that have shown to be most impacted by the climate risks from 1999-2018 (Eckstein et al. 
2019). Such climate dynamics are set to continue undermining access to, and the availability 
and productivity of, key natural resources, thereby contributing to local competition – and 
potentially violence – over access and usage (Detges et al. 2020). This is particularly significant 
in the context of the Dry Corridor, given the extent to which the regional economy is dependent 
on smallholder agriculture: In Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, more than two thirds 
of the population rely on agriculture, the viability of which is intimately tied to ecosystems 
increasingly threatened by climate variability (Bouroncle et al. 2017; Baca et al. 2014). At the 
same time, demand for food products is expected to increase, with Guatemala and Honduras 
amongst the top three countries experiencing the fastest demographic growth in Latin America 
and the Caribbean between 2009 and 2019 (IOM 2020). 













14 Climate security in the Central American Dry Corridor
Local competition is set to increase against the backdrop of a fragile social and institutional 
environment characterized by a history of social, economic, and political exclusion and 
marginalization. Previous conflicts in Central America, such as the Salvadoran Civil War (1979-
1992) and the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996), effectively destroyed social cohesion and 
trust amongst sections of the population. In El Salvador, almost 80,000 people were killed 
during the civil war, 550,000 were internally displaced, and 500,000 became refugees in 
other countries (Manz 2008). During the 36-year civil war in Guatemala, more than 200,000 
people were killed or disappeared and an additional 1.5 million were displaced, with much 
of the violence directed at indigenous communities protesting economic, social, and political 
inequality and marginalization (HMH 2020). A lack of institutional trust remains pervasive 
amongst many indigenous communities to this day, partially due to a continued absence of 
restorative justice for affected communities and individuals. Climate impacts are therefore set 
to increase pressure on contexts already characterized by low social trust, low institutional 
capacity, and high degrees of socio-economic marginalization, thereby lowering the prospects 
of climate-induced competition being resolved equitably and peacefully (Detges et al. 2020). 
These conditions also make Central America vulnerable to agricultural shocks, disruptions 
in food prices, and food insecurity. Estimates show that more than 5.2 million people were 
severely food insecure between 2016 and 2018 (FAO et al. 2019). There is strong evidence to 
suggest that rapidly rising food prices and attendant food insecurity can combine with other 
political pressures and grievances to generate protests, political unrest and violence (Lagi, 
Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 2011; Sternberg 2012). 
Climate variability may also impact social stability, peace, and security through other impact 
pathways. Increasing pressure on rural livelihoods negatively impacts food security and 
the availability and profitability of on- and off-farm employment opportunities, thereby 
reinforcing existing human mobility trends, most notably internal rural-urban migration. The 
relationship between (slow onset) climate shifts and migration are inherently complex. It is 
likely that the effects of climate will manifest themselves through intermediary channels and 
act as a driver of migration only in combination with other drivers, often by exacerbating the 
severity of other, perhaps more primary, migratory incentives (Black et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
migration – whilst in many cases serving as a viable coping strategy (Bosetti, Cattaneo, and 
Peri 2020) – is not an adaptive strategy open to everyone. The decision to migrate is tempered 
by intervening obstacles and facilitators such as the cost of moving, context-based factors 
such as the presence of conflict, and institutional and legal frameworks that may constrain or 
enable movement. Similarly, the exact nature of migratory movements (should the decision 
to migrate be made) will likely be determined by both household-level characteristics and 
broader contextual factors. Migratory movements may, for example, occur over longer or 
shorter distances and timescales, and can be circular or seasonal in nature. Furthermore, as 
outlined by Fréguin-Gresh et al. (2019), the role played by migration in generating household 
income and access to sources of food must be considered within a multi-situated activity 
system, in which dispersion of household members across different income generation 
strategies is the norm (Fréguin-Gresh et al. 2019). These income strategies are deployed across 
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different scales and units, including on farm-activities, off-farm activities at the local level, and 
off-farm activities that are further afield. Risk is therefore diversified across multiple income 
streams, and remittances likely already contribute a significant amount to overall income 
for many households. However, as in-situ risk-management or climate adaptation strategies 
become increasingly strained in the face of climate-related pressures (causing, for instance, a 
lack of agricultural inputs and reduced yields), the relative importance of migratory incomes 
is likely to increase. Others without the capacity to move during times of crisis may end up 
‘trapped’ in climate vulnerable areas (Milan and Ruano 2014; Freeman 2017), or stuck in spaces 
of detention and transit like migrant shelters, especially during the pandemic (Vega Villaseñor 
and Camus Bergareche 2021). Further, recent mass deportation of Central American migrants 
by the US government not only amplified risk of COVID-19 contagion, but also resulted in severe 
insecurities related to food and health confronting the migrants (Hanlon and Nolin 2021).
Increasing and unregulated movement – whether permanent or temporary, over short or 
longer distances – may create new challenges in receiving areas. Already overstretched 
city infrastructure and services may not be able to keep up with population growth, which, 
combined with poor labor market absorption, can give rise to growing poverty and socio-
economic marginalization (Detges et al. 2020). Migrants are also often forced to work in 
informal, poorly regulated sectors such as construction, transport, or household services, 
leaving many open to exploitation and abuse. Such conditions in turn create potential sources 
of tension, conflict and anti-government grievances, particularly if horizontal socio-economic 
fault lines between groups emerge or are exacerbated (Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Østby 2008). 
Stagnant or exploitative economic conditions also lower the opportunity cost of engaging 
in criminal activity, a phenomenon that has already become apparent across the region. In 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, for instance, the prominence of youth street gangs and 
violence is growing rapidly in urbanizing areas (Kunkeler and Peters 2011).
Informal and irregular migration, especially when it occurs across borders, can feed smuggling 
networks often overseen by international crime groups (Sanchez 2018), with large numbers 
of migrants forming both a source of income and a cover for the expansion of drug-related 
activities. Smuggled migrants are known to frequently fall victim to predatory practices and 
sometimes violence (IOM 2020). As the following section outlines in more detail, most of the 
cross-border migration from the Dry Corridor has been northwards. Many if not most of these 
migrants intend to reach the United States in pursuit of livelihood opportunities, access to goods 
and services, and, above all, safety and security. The exact degree to which climate shifts have 
contributed to such movements is difficult to ascertain. However, research on the relationship 
between the rate of Mexican migration to the United States and climate variability found that 
numbers pulsed upwards during periods of drought (Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer 2010). 
This suggests that climate is likely to play at least an additive role in incentivizing migratory 
movements, and the degree to which even comparatively small numbers of migrants has fed 
into political turmoil in the United States is further evidence of how the diffuse and indirect 
impact of climate can contribute to new, or exacerbate existing, tensions. 
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Finally, climate impacts may undermine peace and security by pushing vulnerable communities 
into illegal coping mechanisms, such as the production of illegal cash crops (Detges et al. 2020). 
Especially in Central America, the vulnerability of rural livelihoods has been exploited by non-
state criminal armed groups. A limited number of accessible livelihoods not only incentivizes 
turning towards more lucrative but illegal crop choices, but also provides criminal groups with 
a fertile recruitment ground, particularly among young people (Nillesen and Verwimp 2009; 
Nett and Rüttinger 2016). Beyond offering payment, armed groups may also seek to exploit 
political grievances or a lack of social cohesion within and between communities. In certain 
cases, such groups may also become the de-facto authority in a particular area, capitalizing 
on the absence of state supported services such as education, healthcare, and food provision 
(Fulton and Nickels 2017). 
Figure 1 maps the complex interactions and emergent causal pathways within the climate 
security nexus in the Central American context. It does so by charting the pathways identified 
above through which climate-induced ecological shifts impact socio-economic systems that 
can subsequently lead to violent conflict. Represented in yellow are several theoretical entry 
points, within which R4D interventions may contribute to mitigating and stabilizing functions, 
ideally combined with socioeconomic and political security-enhancing interventions. 
Figure 1. Mapping climate security interactions and emergent causal pathways.
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2. What are Public Perceptions of Climate Security in the 
Central American Dry Corridor? 
In 2020, there were around 580,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from the northern region 
of Central America, due to the worsening crime and violence at home, along with fragile 
institutions and increasing inequalities (UNHCR 2021).
Hurricanes Eta and Lota affected approximately 7.3 million people in Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua and caused devastation in staple food production just before harvest time 
(UNICEF 2021). Natural disasters such as droughts, hurricanes and fires leave people without 
a livelihood, especially those who were already vulnerable.
Social inequalities and climate change are closely linked. The triangular relation between 
poverty-migration-climate change in the CADC is an ever-pressing and growing challenge. 
However, it appears that the general public does not understand these relationships in the 
same way, even though past breadbasket failures and social unrest have been clearly matched 
to conflicts (Granados Martinez 2017). We analyzed, as a case study, 30 recent media bulletins 
from six major newspapers in Mexico, selected by searching for keywords climate change 
and agricultural production, and migration and political instability. Recurring word counts 
were used to generate word clouds for both searches. These clearly demonstrate the lack of 
overlap between migration and climate change narratives. Journalists and readers did relate 
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greenhouse gas emissions, and food security. But even when COVID-19 was incorporated 
into the discussions on agricultural productivity in relation to climate change, only minimal 
reference was made to issues around displacement, migration and vulnerability of people 
and poverty. Development issues and political references to global trade were slightly more 
common (Figure 2a,b).
Media discussions of migration and political instability show similar patterns of dis-connect. 
The migration problematic was unambiguously present in the whole CADC, as evidenced 
by the high number of recurring mentions of all the relevant countries. Migration issues 
revolved mainly around gender violence and organized crime. Especially in this context, it was 
surprising to find a complete absence of the food security narrative: economic difficulties and 
income-related problems, as well as the disruptions due to the pandemic, only appeared in 
the background. This absence may in part be explained by the high concern about feminicides 
in Mexico and the journalistic (e.g., tabloid) reporting style (Figure 2). 
The general conclusion is clear: in the mainstream media outlets, the climate security nexus 
is seldom identified as such – and seldom seen as an underlying driver of socio-economic 
instability. We implemented a more in-depth exercise investigating social media postings 
(Twitter), to see whether policymakers in their communications make a connection between 
climate and conflict. We used network analysis to identify keywords and terms that occur in 
proximity and to visualize the strength of their relationship (Jacomy et al. 2014). Keywords 
Figure 2. Mapping keywords about (a) climate change and agricultural production and  
(b) migration and political instability in Mexican newspaper bulletins.
(a) (b)
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Figure 3. Mapping social media discussions of (a) climate change and (b) conflict. 
related to climate, conflict and socioeconomic drivers were identified based on terms present 
in the Impact Pathways. In this case, the nodes of the network were composed of words present 
in the corpus of tweets. We ran this analysis for a selection of Twitter accounts maintained by 
national ministries and the central governments of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.
Figure 3a, b presents network visualizations of terms related to climate (a) and terms related 
to conflict (b) for the CADC countries. Overall, the keywords for each topic appear on the edges 
of the networks, such as “climate”, “crime” or “violence”. Terms in the center of the networks 
are those which have been detected to appear in proximity to the keywords within tweets.  Our 
results show that the central themes of climate-related tweets, water, rain, and climate, were 
frequently associated with agricultural productivity, poverty, food security and migration. 
Conflict-related words such as “security” and “gangs” do appear in the climate network, 
suggesting some policymakers are aware of the linkages between climate and socio-political 
insecurities.
 
How significant is the perceived linkage? The conflict graph (Figure 3b) is dominated by 
security as a central theme. There is a clear connection between violence and community 
security, as shown by the green cluster. We also find evidence that some of the climate security 
drivers, represented by the word “production”, are sometimes linked to the discourse around 
national security. On the other hand, in the climate graph (Figure 3a), looking at the largest 
cluster in blue, one notes that the strongest connections for “security” are in relation to “food”, 
“agriculture”, and “production", which means that the word appears in the climate network 
mostly related to “food security”, rather than conflict-related security. This suggests that 
government actors’ awareness of the implication of climate impacts on conflicts and security 
is not remarkably high.
(a) (b)
Network visualisations of word collocates for keywords related to (a) climate and  (b) conflict in tweets by government 
actors in the Dry Corridor. Force-directed graph, with node size partitioned by betweenness centrality and colored by 
modularity class.
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CLIMATE SECURITY POLICIES
3. Do Policies in the Central American Dry Corridor Support 
Climate Security? 
The climate crisis requires policymakers to clearly understand when, where, and how climate 
impacts can translate into insecurities. They need to have a closer look at policies that address 
existing insecurities and how these interact with the climate crisis. Some policies will need to 
be re-designed using climate security lenses; some will need to be newly developed.
Therefore, we ask: To what extent have climate and national security policies been designed 
and implemented with a climate security lens?  To answer this question, we analyzed policy 
documents at the national and regional levels. At the national level, we analyzed 28 policy 
documents from eight countries in the region: Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama, spanning across the Central American Dry Corridor 
and including Colombia and Mexico. We also analyzed four policy documents of the Central 
American Integration System (SICA in Spanish) for the regional level.
National policy documents correspond to current development plans, migration policies, 
national security policies, and disaster risk management policies. At the regional level, we 
sought similar policies in the same categories. We collected the data using a web search of 
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To perform the research, we used data science and text mining to obtain a database of words 
from the processed texts (Silge and Robinson 2016; Statsoft 2020). To generate patterns, trend 
metrics, etc., we applied unstructured data cleaning processes such as: eliminating stop words 
(prepositions, articles, etc.), symbols, and numbers, among other elements from documents 
that are not part of the narrative analysis. Finally, we quantified the frequency of words in the 
processed texts. 
To integrate the climate security lens into the analysis, we looked for keywords related to 
climate, safety, and socio-economic drivers in each type of policy document. The keywords 
used for the analysis are:
• Climate: Climate change, climate variability, temperature, rain, drought, disease, 
flood, deforestation, degradation, scarcity, adaptation, natural resources, disaster risk 
management, losses.  
• Socioeconomic drivers: Land tenure, poverty, food security, nutrition, migration, 
displacement, agriculture, rural, malnutrition, community, food.  
• Conflict: Conflict, drugs, cartel, demonstration, protest, drug trafficking, homicide, gang, 
crime, violence, security.  
We measured the importance of each keyword by its presence or absence in the texts. We 
calculated the level of use of these words in the processed texts as a rate (%). The results 
are summarized in Figure 4 for national policy documents and Figure 5 for regional policy 
documents.
• National development plans broadly integrate climate change, security, and socio-
economic drivers. However, socio-economic drivers have more intensity in the documents 
followed by climate change and conflict drivers. Some striking findings correspond to the 
lack of integration of climate topics in Mexico and conflict issues in Colombia and Panama.
• Disaster risk management policies broadly integrate climate drivers; however, there is a 
gap regarding socio-economic and conflict drivers. Countries that most incorporate climate 
change are Panama, Honduras, and Costa Rica, in contrast to Mexico, which integrates 
climate to a small extent. The latter may be because disaster risk management issues fall 
under the general civil protection law, which addresses broader issues.
• Migration policies essentially respond to socioeconomic factors; however, they poorly 
integrate climate change and conflict issues. Panama, Guatemala, and Costa Rica integrate 
the categories of climate change and conflict to a greater extent than others; however, its 
presence is not strong.
• National security policies broadly integrate conflict and socioeconomic drivers; however, 
they do not consider climate topics. Climate topics are present to a greater extent in 
countries such as Nicaragua and Guatemala.
Regional policies1 respond mainly to socio-economic and climate change issues. The regional 
policies with the greatest inclusion of climate change are the Central American Policy for 
 1 Regional policies included in the study are: The Central American Policy for Integral Disaster Risk Management (PCGIR), SICA 
Regional Integral Social Policy (PSIR) 2020-2040, Central American Strategy for Rural Development (ECADERT), Agricultural Policy 
for the SICA Region (PAR) 2019-2030.
Integral Disaster Risk Management (PCGIR) and the Agricultural Policy for the SICA Region 
(PAR). The PCGIR has the highest level of inclusion; this reflects the nature of the policy since 
it is mainly linked to risks generated by climate. The PAR integrates the climate change issue 
to a large degree since it is crucial not to ignore that agricultural activity is highly vulnerable to 
changes in climate. Despite the above, conflict issues only appear slightly in the SICA Regional 
Integral Social Policy (PSIR), suggesting possible gaps regarding conflict issues in the policies, 
especially those that combine and strongly integrate socio-economic and climate change 
issues. 
In general, it is evident that climate, conflict, and socio-economic categories are disconnected 
from each other in most documents. Nevertheless, the climate crisis is a reality. Every day, it 
impacts the countries in the region more severely, so national and regional authorities must 
begin to recognize that these negative impacts can translate into insecurities, exacerbating 
the challenges that they currently face concerning socio-economic and conflict issues.
Figure 4. Results of analysis of national policy documents.
Key: CL: Colombia, CR: Costa Rica, GT: Guatemala, HN: Honduras, MX: México, NIC: Nicaragua, PN: Panamá, SL: El Salvador.
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Figure 5. Results of analysis of regional policy documents. 
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DRIVERS OF CLIMATE SECURITY
4. What are the Drivers of Climate Security in the Central 
American Dry Corridor?
Building on the results of the impact pathway analysis, this section maps climate security hot 
spots and their underlying drivers to inform policy and programming.
Three countries were analyzed, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador over the period for 
which data were available (2018–2020) in the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED) Database (ACLED n.d.). We distinguish between conflict intensity, measured by the 
total number of events, and diversity, measured by the number of different type of conflicts. 
We found that conflict intensity is generally greater in Honduras, followed by Guatemala and 
then El Salvador.  In these countries, gangs and non-state armed groups are by far the leading 
violent actors, as they are responsible for virtually all the battles (armed clashes) and violence 
against civilians (mostly attacks).
The spatial characterization of the climate security nexus aims to identify localities where 
climate, conflict and other insecurities co-occur. The approach used in this analysis recognizes 
the spatial variability of climate, conflict, food insecurity and the other drivers, but attempts 
to synthesize this variability into a manageable set of groups or classes per dimension of 
interest (e.g., climate, food insecurity, natural resources) that can be used to identify spatial 
hotspots. The information on these localities can be used to inform geospatial prioritization 
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and then we overlay other existing insecurities, namely, natural and farm resources and socio-
economic vulnerability. The next sections explore the spatial variation in conflict, climate, 
food insecurity and other drivers (Figures 6-8).
GUATEMALA
In Guatemala, climates with short Mid-Summer Drought (MSD) dominate, but they vary widely 
in intensity across the country and within conflict clusters. The extreme and high conflict 
clusters are both dominated by climates with short MSDs but extreme drought (100% and 82% 
of municipalities, respectively). In the moderate conflict cluster, conversely, these short MSD 
and extreme drought conditions occur in only 5% of the municipalities, but short MSDs with 
mild or insignificant drought are more dominant (32.5% in each case). The limited conflict 
cluster, on the other hand, shows 39% of municipalities in the short MSD climate with extreme 
drought, followed by short MSD with mild drought (27%).
The departments of Baja Verapaz, Huehuetenango and Quiché show the greatest nutritional 
insecurity problems. In many of the areas in which undernutrition hotspots are identified, 
inequality is also a problem. Particular attention should be given to western Guatemala due to 
the significant occurrence of gender gaps.
Low productivity hotspots are mainly concentrated across the subsistence farming areas, 
south of Quiche, Huehuetenango, and departments of Chimaltenango, Totonicapan, Solola 
and Quetzaltenango, and to a lesser extent in the south.
High conflict areas are associated with high accessibility of mining concessions, and to a 
lesser extent, the combination of mining and cash crops, and the combination of these with 
deforestation areas. In moderate conflict areas, we note more prevalence of deforestation 
access spots (Peten department) and cash crop presence (south).
In conclusion, particular attention should be given to the rural and peri-urban areas around 
Guatemala City, which show high conflict occurrence while at the same time being socially 
vulnerable. We also highlight the subsistence farming areas in Huehuetenango, Quiché, and 
Baja Verapaz, where social vulnerability is high and climate conditions can exacerbate this 
vulnerability. While these areas are classified as having only limited conflict, conflict is still 
prevalent.
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Figure 6. Maps show a) geographic distribution of conflict clusters of Guatemala,  
b) undernutrition hotspots, c) inequality hotspots, d) hotspots of access to valuable 





In Honduras, long and extremely dry MSD conditions dominate in all conflict clusters, but 
especially in the high diversity – high intensity cluster (75% of municipalities). As conflict 
intensity and conflict diversity reduce, so does the dominance of this type of climate, with 
43.3% of municipalities having long and extremely dry MSD in the moderate conflict diversity 
cluster – low intensity conflict cluster, and 27.7% municipalities in the low diversity – low 
intensity conflict cluster.
High nutritional insecurity is found in the west in the departments of Copán, Intibucá, Lempira 
and Ocotepeque. Undernutrition is also a significant problem in specific pockets within the 
department of Madre de Dios (eastern Honduras). In many of the areas in which undernutrition 
hotspots are identified, inequality is also a problem. Particular attention should be given 
western Honduras due to significant occurrence of gender gaps.
Hotspots occur toward the south (Fonseca Gulf) but also in the west, where undernutrition 
and inequality are problematic. Similarly, in both Guatemala and Honduras, high conflict and 
moderate conflict co-occur with mining and/or mining – cash crop density areas.
In conclusion, the southern areas of Honduras (Choluteca department) show significant social 
and biophysical vulnerability, while also showing moderate to high conflict. In these areas, 
we find low productivity staple crop systems combined with high accessibility to mining 
concessions and some presence of cash crops (cotton, coffee). We also highlight the areas of 
western Honduras (Copán, Intibucá, Lempira) where nutritional insecurity is high, but conflict 
has low intensity and diversity.
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador shows the most favorable climate conditions of the three countries. Across 
the conflict clusters, short MSDs with mild drought occur in 95% of the municipalities with 
moderate conflict diversity, in 86% of the municipalities with high conflict diversity, and in 
62% of the municipalities with low conflict diversity.
Nutritional insecurity problems are concentrated toward the borders with Honduras and 
Guatemala, suggesting a likely relationship with migration. In many of the areas in which 
undernutrition hotspots are identified, inequality is also a problem. Particular attention 
should be given to south-western El Salvador due to the significant gender gaps.
Low productivity is concentrated towards the west of the country, on the border with Guatemala. 
High diversity conflict tends to co-occur near deforestation areas, whereas moderate conflict 
is more likely in areas of high cash crop cultivation.
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Figure 7. The maps show a) geographic 
distribution of conflict clusters of 
Honduras, b) undernutrition hotspots, 
c) inequality hotspots, d) hotspots of 
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Figure 8. The maps show a) geographic 
distribution of conflict clusters of El 
Salvador, b) undernutrition hotspots, 
c) inequality hotspots, d) hotspots of 
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In conclusion, vulnerability hotspots tend to cover border areas (with both Honduras and 
Guatemala). Though these areas do not show high conflict, they do show a high prevalence 
of stunting. High conflict areas of El Salvador tend to be associated with access to forest 
resources, whereas the moderate conflict cluster shows low agricultural productivity for staple 
crops, high density of cash crops, and to a lesser degree, access to forest resources.
In summary, in El Salvador, the climate security nexus is characterized by the combination 
of ENSO effects and mid-summer drought intensity (ecological system), higher household 
dependency ratio, youth unemployment, agricultural income, accessibility, inability to meet 
basic needs, wealth (socio-economic system) and diversity of conflicts (political system) at 
national level.  In Guatemala, the climate security nexus is characterized by the ENSO effect 
and MSD duration (ecological system), food security, ability to meet basic needs, lack of 
education and limited access to alternative sources of income (socio-economic system) and 
number of conflicts (political system). In Honduras, the climate security nexus is characterized 
by MSD magnitude duration and ENSO effect (ecological system), cropping area and access to 
alternative sources of income (socio-economic system) and number of conflicts and diversity 
of conflict actors (political system).
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5. What do Climate and Peace Indicators Tell us about Climate 
Security in the Central American Dry Corridor?
Conventional evaluations and indices that measure the extent and quality of peace and 
security usually fail to acknowledge the role that climate can play in insecurity and conflict. As 
already mentioned, climate has the potential to threaten the stability of states and societies by 
exacerbating socio-economic and political risks, vulnerabilities and insecurities, such as food 
insecurity, poverty, forced migration, displacement, and inequality that are ultimately the 
root causes of instability, tensions and conflicts. Despite the growing recognition of the role 
of climate as a “threat multiplier”, current indicators of peace and security do not accurately 
quantify the impacts of climate change or variability on existing risks, vulnerabilities and 
insecurities that can increase the risk of conflict. This is particularly important in many 
developing countries, including those in the CADC region, that are highly exposed and 
vulnerable to climate extremes and hazards. Even many peaceful countries in the CADC region 
are regularly exposed to diversified risks that have a remarkably high destabilizing potential 
at country, regional and local level. And yet, security and peace indicators do not properly 
measure this risk, or at best, do it marginally. 
Similarly, practitioners, donors, investors, and national and international policymakers from 
the climate and security community have thus far worked in isolation, not fully aware of 
the complex and multifaceted interlinkages between these two dimensions, and therefore 
ignoring the implications of climate for security and vice-versa. On the one hand, climate 
adaptation and resilience programs are often conflict-blind, which can lead to unintended 
consequences and trade-offs such as reinforcing structural and contextual drivers of conflict. 
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Several examples exist of conflict-insensitive adaptation measures that have increased the 
potential for conflict by damaging economic prospects, undermining political stability, and 
amplifying social inequalities and grievances (Krampe, Smith, and Hamidi 2021; Baysal and 
Uluç Karakaş 2017). This is, for instance, the case of the Salma Dam in Afghanistan that, despite 
being built as an effort to increase renewable energy production, reduce GHG emissions and 
enhance irrigation schemes, adversely impacted peace in downstream communities. The 
deficient management of the dam, which ignored the needs of some of the farmers, increased 
grievances over water access and increased the level of local instability and conflict (Krampe, 
Smith and Hamidi, 2021; Baysal and Karakaş, 2017). 
On the other hand, traditional peacebuilding approaches tend to be climate-insensitive, 
not accounting for the complex climate-conflict connections, and therefore ill-equipped to 
respond to the increasingly complex security environment in which they operate (Krampe 
2019). Therefore, this section makes the case for development of improved indicators 
and measurements that are sensitive to both climate and conflict. Such an effort will help 
practitioners, donors, investors, and policymakers to gain a better understanding of how 
climate and conflict dynamics play out in specific contexts, identifying the areas and groups 
that are most vulnerable to climate induced insecurities, and inform appropriate climate 
security-sensitive strategies that integrate the linkages between climate, conflict, agriculture 
and migration. 
Indices are useful tools to facilitate the analysis, study and comparison of complex realities by 
creating a visual numeric representation of said reality. The main challenge is the definition 
of the concepts, given the lack of consensus on the conceptualization of peace and security. 
Even so, peace and security indices are still a valuable tool to inform academics, practitioners, 
donors, investors, and national and international policymakers about a complicated and 
heterogeneous reality. To illustrate the peace and security context of countries in the CADC 
region, this analysis will use two indices that enable comparison with the existing natural and 
socio-economic risks of those states. 
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) made a useful contribution to the field by 
developing the Global Peace Index (GPI) and the Positive Peace Index (PPI), two of the most 
relevant peace and security indicators. The GPI is an annual estimate of negative peace – defined 
by Galtung (1996) as the absence of violence (Galtung 1996) – that ranks a list of 163 states 
and territories according to their peacefulness. It uses 23 indicators and three main criteria: 
ongoing domestic and international conflicts, societal safety and security, and militarization. 
For its scoring system, the GPI uses both qualitative and quantitative data provided by some 
of the most renowned institutions in the field of conflict and security, including the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Committee on 
Contributions, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the World Prison Brief, among others 
(Institute for Economics & Peace 2020a). 
33Climate security in the Central American Dry Corridor
The PPI is an annual measure of positive peace which is defined as “the attitudes, institutions 
and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies” (Institute for Economics & Peace 
2020b). It is based on eight main pillars, including well-functioning government, sound 
business environment, acceptance of the rights of the others, free flow of information, high 
levels of human capital, low level of corruption, equitable redistribution of resources, and 
good relations with neighbors. The IEP regards positive peace as a proxy of a country’s level of 
socio-economic resilience. In other words, it is viewed as a bulwark that may help to neutralize 
or mitigate potential risks or threats to sustain peace. For its scoring system, the PPI uses 
both qualitative and quantitative data provided by highly respected sources, including the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Tourism Organization (WTO), the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNESCO, the 
World Bank, Freedom House, and the World Economic Forum (Institute for Economics & Peace 
2020b).
The INFORM Risk Index is a well-regarded measurement of states’ risk of suffering from 
humanitarian crises and disasters that could overwhelm national response capacity. It was 
developed by a partnership of UN agencies, NGOs, donors, and research institutes and has 
already been incorporated into the internal decision-making processes of several UN agencies 
(e.g., World Food Program and UNICEF), as well donor agencies, including USAID and FCDO. 
The INFORM Risk Index combines a total of 54 indicators into three risk dimensions: hazards 
and exposure to them; vulnerability; and lack of coping capacity (Marin-Ferrer, Vernaccini, and 
Poljansek 2017). For this analysis, only a few variables were selected to show different natural 
and socio-economic risks as well as existing coping capacities. The selected variables help 
to illustrate how most of the countries of the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region –
even some of the most peaceful ones – lack strong coping capacities while facing different 
natural hazards. This could act as a threat multiplier, impacting existing socio-economic 
vulnerabilities and potentially leading to insecurity or even conflict. However, this reality is 
not adequately measured by existing peace and security indicators which should become 
more climate-sensitive and incorporate the risks posed by the climate crisis to appropriately 
measure peace and security. 
Table 1 outlines the countries from the CADC region and the entire LAC, regarding natural 
hazards, socio-economic vulnerabilities, security risks and coping capacities. The GPI and 
the PPI values shown in the table are the ranking of the countries in the two indices. They 
are highlighted in the table according to the state of peace of the countries defined by the 
IEP (2020a, 2020b), which range from very low to very high depending on their score. For 
facilitating the visualization, the table merges the categories “very high” and “high” into a 
single one – highlighted in dark red – and the “very low” and “low” category into another 
one – highlighted in light red. The rest of the variables, extracted from the INFORM Risk Index, 
illustrate values that estimate different risks ranging from 0 to 10. Specifically, values from 0 to 
3.5 are considered low, values from 3.5 to 5 are considered medium – highlighted in light red 
– and values from 5 to 10 are deemed high – highlighted in dark red (Marin-Ferrer, Vernaccini, 
and Poljansek 2017).  
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Table 1. Peace indicators, natural hazards, socio-economic vulnerabilities, security risks and coping capacities of countries from the CADC and LAC.

































RANKING/SCORE 1-163 1-163 1-23 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10 0-10
CENTRAL AMERICAN DRY CORRIDOR
Costa Rica 32 37 9 3.8 4.3 0.1 5.2 3.4 3.6 1.6 3 3.3 4.1
Panama 56 54 11 3.5 5 0.2 4.6 3.7 6.2 4 4.4 5.1 5
El Salvador 113 88 16 3.4 8.7 4.3 9.3 5.3 5 7.9 5.9 7.2 6.7
Guatemala 115 111 21 6 9.3 5.9 8.4 8.9 7.1 9.1 8.5 7.6 8.2
Honduras 119 109 22 6.7 9.5 4.6 9.3 8.4 7.5 8.2 8.1 7.9 8.1
Nicaragua 135 105 19 7.2 8.4 8 4.4 5.8 7.1 7.9 6.7 6.3 6.6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Uruguay 35 29 1 5.2 2.5 0.1 4.2 2.3 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9
Chile 45 41 8 7 3.7 2.9 4.3 1.9 4.1 1.8 2.4 2.8 3.6
Argentina 74 57 4 7.9 5.6 1.7 5.3 3.6 4.3 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.1
Paraguay 75 94 3 6.3 6.9 2.5 4.8 4.5 5.7 5 4.9 5.3 4.8
Dominican  
Republic
76 78 17 5.6 4.6 4.1 5.6 4.2 5.1 7.3 5.2 6.3 5.7
Jamaica 80 47 10 3.8 3.9 1.8 9 3.9 7.8 7.5 5.8 6.8 5.7
Guyana 82 91 5 8.4 3.9 0.8 4.8 4.6 8 8.3 6.4 5.8 5.2
Peru 84 76 14 8.1 5.7 2.5 5.6 4.4 6.4 6.1 5.3 5.5 6
Cuba 86 69 12 4.1 6 2.5 4.2 3.8 3 1.1 2.9 3.6 4.4
Bolivia 86 105 7 7.4 6.8 5.7 4.5 6.2 6.9 8.3 6.9 6.8 6
Trinidad and  
Tobago
88 59 2 0.4 1.7 0.7 8.7 2.4 2.9 1.3 2.3 5.6 4.8
Ecuador 90 82 15 9.2 5.6 0.6 4.7 3.8 5.3 6 4.7 5.4 5.8
Haiti 111 149 23 5.1 8.4 6.2 5.2 10 7.3 9.5 9.2 9 8.5
Brazil 126 78 6 8.9 6.3 7 10 3.7 5.7 1.8 3.7 4.4 5.6
Mexico 137 71 20 8.1 7 9 9.3 4.4 4.6 3.4 4.2 4.5 6
Colombia 140 82 18 8.3 4.5 7 8.7 4 6.4 4.8 4.8 6 7
Venezuela 149 135 13 6.6 4.4 6.6 9.7 4.9 8.1 3.5 5.4 6.9 7.2
INFORM. 2019. "Latin America and the Caribbean - INFORM Risk Index 2020". 
Luxembourg. Available at: https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-
Subnational-Risk/Latin-America-and-Caribbean/moduleId/1800/id/368/controller/
Admin/action/Results
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Table 1 shows that most of the CADC countries face numerous climate-related risks that 
could exacerbate existing socio-economic risks and vulnerabilities. Examples include poverty, 
inequality and violence, among others, that are ultimately the root causes of instability, 
insecurity and conflicts. This is particularly worrisome, as, despite being severely affected 
by natural hazards, most of the countries show a low level of resilience, measured by their 
low coping capacity. This is an indicator that estimates the level of available resources to 
alleviate the impact of hazards and vulnerabilities based on existing physical infrastructure, 
communications, governance, access to a health system, and Disaster Risk Reduction 
implementation. Except for Costa Rica, all of the countries in the CADC show a low level of 
coping capacity. This is especially alarming because the countries that are most vulnerable 
to natural hazards are also those most affected by conflict and violence.  However, even some 
of the most peaceful countries in the LAC region have a low level of resilience despite facing 
a series of climate-related risks. Specifically, Uruguay and Chile are the only two countries 
with a high level of coping capacity. This shows how even the most peaceful countries are not 
completely safe amidst a climate crisis that is already impacting everyone.
Regarding natural hazards, flood risk is a common feature in both groups of countries: El Salvador 
and Trinidad and Tobago are the only states from the CADC and LAC with a low level of flood 
risk. This phenomenon is especially alarming in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala – scores 
of 7.2, 6.7 and 6 respectively – where thousands of people, including at least 70 deaths, were 
affected by floods last year (UN News 2020; VOA 2020). Environmental degradation and drought 
are other serious climate related risks, particularly in CADC where five countries face a high 
risk and the other three face a medium risk. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
experience alarming levels of drought that, along with COVID-19 and other natural hazards, have 
quadrupled hunger and pushed thousands of people to migrate (Noticias ONU 2021).
Regarding human hazards, conflict risk2 is comparatively lower than violence risk3 in both 
groups of states. Most of the countries from the second group have a low level of conflict 
risk but all of them face high or medium risk of violence, as estimated using the intentional 
homicide rate and the intentional homicide count indicators from the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (Marin-Ferrer, Vernaccini, and Poljansek 2017). Likewise, two of the CADC 
states have a high risk of conflict while four face a high risk of violence: Panama, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. These data demonstrate that, despite not having open 
armed conflicts in any of the countries, the risk of violence is a core problem in the region. In 
relation to socioeconomic vulnerabilities, which estimates the (in)ability of people to afford 
safe and resilient livelihood conditions and well-being, Costa Rica is the only CADC country 
that shows a low level of exposure, while the rest, especially Guatemala and Honduras, show 
high or medium levels of exposure. 
2 Conflict risk is estimated using the national power conflicts and the subnational power conflicts indicators from the Conflict 
Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) as well as the probability of violent conflict and 
highly violent conflict indicator developed by the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI).
3 The risk of violence is estimated using the intentional homicide rate and the intentional homicide count indicators from the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
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Using the development deprivation risk, which estimates socio-economic capabilities and 
deprivation by combining the Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty 
Index, four CADC countries show high levels of risk: El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua. The dependency risk, which measures sustainability in development growth as 
related to economic instability and humanitarian crisis by a combination of the estimates of 
public aid per capita and the net official development assistance received in percentage of 
gross national income, is also very high in four CADC countries and seven from the whole LAC 
region. In addition, inequality is clearly one of the most common and alarming risks as Latin 
America is the most unequal region in the world. A total of eleven countries from the LAC region 
and five of the CADC states have a high inequality risk. In fact, there are only two countries that 
show a low level of inequality: Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago. Inequality is a worrisome risk 
as it may lead to slower economic growth and poverty reduction, limited upward mobility, 
mistrust of institutions, and growing unrest (United Nations 2020a).
The risks are likely to be exacerbated by the natural hazards present in all of the countries 
characterized by climate variability and extremes. In this context, the threat multiplier effect 
of climate change will intensify existing vulnerabilities such as violence and inequality. This 
negative potential of climate variability and extremes is particularly worrisome due to the 
widespread low level of climate resilience.  
In conclusion, the combination of high exposure to climate-related risks, generally low resilience 
to natural disasters, and low coping capacity implies that even the most peaceful countries in the 
CADC and LAC regions are not completely safe amidst a climate crisis that is already impacting 
everyone. Even if some of these countries are comparatively less vulnerable and have lower 
levels of risks in some of the variables, they still face the threat of climate variability and various 
natural hazards which can aggravate existing socio-economic and political vulnerabilities. This, 
in turn, could lead these countries to instability or even violent conflict.
Peace and security indicators such as the GPI and the PPI by themselves do not accurately 
measure the potential impact of climate change and variability on socio-economic risks and 
insecurities that can increase the risk of conflict. Improved peace and security indicators and 
measurements that are climate sensitive should be developed to help practitioners, donors, 
investors, and policymakers to gain an adequate understanding of how climate and conflict 
complex dynamics play out in specific contexts and identify appropriate strategies that 
integrate climate adaptation and peacebuilding activities in environmental programming.
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6. How can Research for Development Contribute to Climate 
Security in the Central American Dry Corridor?
This section presents three case studies on how local community-based and participatory 
processes for addressing climate change and variability contribute to addressing the main 
drivers of climate-food security-conflict impact pathways. Figure 9 indicates which drivers 
the climate-smart villages (CSV), the local technical agroclimatic committees (LTAC) and the 
Integrated Agri-food System Initiatives in Latin America, described below, directly or indirectly 
address. For each case we explain the concept and the drivers addressed in the context of 
migration and security challenges rural farmers are facing on top of climate change impacts. 
The Figure shows the main drivers of climate-food security-conflict impact pathways addressed 
in each case study. The green circles in the figure correspond to the CSV approach, the red 
ones to the LTAC approach, and the blue ones to the Integrated Agri-food System Initiatives in 
Mexico and Colombia. Solid lines in the figure refers to a direct relation of the case studies with 
each driver pointed, and dotted lines to an indirect relation.
6.1. Participatory community-based adaptation: Climate Smart Villages approach  
Since 2011, the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security 
(CCAFS4) has led the Climate-Smart Villages (CSV) approach together with CGIAR centers and 
key partners in five world regions (Latin America, East Africa, West Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
South Asia)5 . Since 2015, CCAFS has implemented the CSV approach in four Latin American 
countries: Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 
4 About CCAFS: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/
5About CSV globally: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/climate-smart-villages#.W3bjss70mMo 
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Figure 9: Drivers of climate-food security-conflict impact pathways addressed in each case study.
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The CSVs are living laboratories that generate evidence about how, in a given territory, different 
actors (farmers, researchers, government, private sector, civil society) can most effectively 
co-develop, test, adapt, and evaluate portfolios of integrated and innovative options that 
promote climate-smart agriculture and improve the rural population's livelihoods in a context 
of climate variability and change. The CSV approach addresses the main impact pathways 
through which climate variability can affect peace and security of rural populations engaged 
in agriculture (food and nutrition security) and ecosystem services. 
CSVs contribute to different climate-food security-conflict impact pathways. Through 
understanding and use of agroclimatic information, farmers in CSVs are better prepared to 
face climate variability. The use of agroclimatic information allows them to be informed and 
prepared for the next cropping seasons and reduces the likelihood of having production 
losses, income reductions, and food insecurity. Implementing climate smart agriculture 
(CSA) practices can increase agricultural productivity and reduce natural resource scarcity6 
(Almentero et al. 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). The CSV approach aims to enhance adaptive and 
transformative resilience. 
Adaptive resilience of local institutions, rural communities and farmers in the CSVs is improved 
by strengthening their knowledge and skills on CSA practices and technologies. Capacity 
building and knowledge exchange are crucial to increase social capital and cohesion, which 
will ensure long-term benefits and sustainability in the territories, while scaling the approach 
to more smallholder farmers and communities.
Improving the climate resilience of farmers has a positive impact on the stability of their 
income and livelihoods year after year; moreover, farmers feel more attached to their land 
and motivated to change and improve their agricultural production and livelihoods, which 
strengthen their roots to their territory. Thus, farmers are less incentivized to migrate and 
the likelihood of getting involved in illicit activities such as the production and processing of 
illegal crops (coca and marihuana) is lower. 
In Cauca, Colombia for example, cultivating illegal drugs is an activity that often constitutes 
the only possibility for rural youth to earn money. CSV communities are constantly exposed 
to these activities due to their geographic location where climate and biophysical conditions 
are suitable for the development of these crops. Moreover, it is one of the corridors through 
which illicit drugs are mobilized for sale to other regions of the country and abroad. Farmers 
are often reached by illegal groups to allow them the transport illicit products and lease their 
land for growing coca crops. However, despite both the illicit and climate pressures, farmers 
have resisted due to their courage, increased social capital and empowerment, as well as the 
improvement of their livelihoods and income as a result of the implementation of the CSV 
approach (Martinez-Barón, n.d.; Sarruf Romero 2020; Ortega and Martínez-Barón 2018).
6 CSA practices include crop diversification, intercropping, organic fertilizers, drought-tolerant seeds, water harvesting (cisterns, 
tanks, reservoirs), climate-smart home gardens (which include water harvesting systems, drip irrigation, and organic fertilizers), 
among others.
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6.2 Climate services increasing local resilience: Local Technical Agroclimatic Committees (LTAC) 
approach
Local Technical Agro-climatic Committee (LTAC) is an approach that seeks to facilitate dialogue 
among diverse local stakeholders to understand and discuss weather and climate forecasts 
and reports on the likely crop response to the climate for specific conditions in a specific 
time and space (Loboguerrero et al. 2018). Through crop models and both local farmer and 
expert knowledge, crop choice and management options are discussed and after consensus 
is reached, these are included in the Local Agroclimatic Bulletin to be shared throughout LTAC 
participants’ networks to reach a large number of farmers. The discussion is not only focused 
on climate, but also markets for the produce and availability of inputs. 
Since 2015, when the approach was developed by CCAFS and partners in Colombia, LTACs have 
rapidly expanded across Latin America and now involve about 350 institutions7. Currently, 
an estimated 250,000 farmers receive tailored agro-climatic information through 50 LTACs 
in 11 countries of Latin America (Giraldo-Mendez D et al., 2021: 5) incorporating it into their 
decision-making processes (Ramírez Villegas et al. 2020). These farmers have documented 
changes in their management practices. Common changes observed on farms include changes 
in planting dates to take better advantage of good climatic conditions or to avoid losses, and 
the use of varieties more suitable for the expected climatic conditions. The LTAC approach has 
also focused on strengthening capacities to co-produce, translate, transfer, and use climate 
information for agriculture at over 300 institutions in Latin America8.
LTACs mitigate different climate-food security-conflict impact pathways. They reduce crop 
losses by providing higher confidence and quality climate and agro-climatic information, 
allowing its incorporation into agricultural decision-making and planning process, and thus 
mitigating unpredictable climate variability. LTACs democratize agro-climatic knowledge 
by making the information known, understandable, and connected. LTACs also increase 
knowledge on CSA practices. Knowing future climate patterns supports implementing climate-
smart production, avoiding or reducing production losses and increasing food security. 
Finally, LTACs increase institutional adaptive capacity, significantly influencing national and 
institutional policy changes, fostering inter-institutional alliances to deal with climate risks. 
Overall, LTACs significantly increase adaptive and transformative resilience capacities (Hiles, 
Navarro-Racines, and Giraldo Mendez 2020).
The LTAC approach is today an excellent example of the successful implementation of climate 
services in the SICA (Central American Integration System) region. It has allowed countries to 
move towards a more resilient agriculture in response to climate challenges. Motivated by the 
success and progress of the approach, the Central American Agricultural Council (CAC, in Spanish) 
has strongly emphasized the CSA Strategy for the SICA region, which includes a "Comprehensive 
Risk Management and Climate Adaptation" component (Martínez-Barón et al. 2021).
7  LTACs participants include Ministries of Agriculture; Ministries of Environment; producers' associations; Meteorological Service 
Institutes; academy and research institutions; subnational governments; international cooperation and civil society.
8  For instance, CCAFS has worked with partner organizations in Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala to assess seasonal forecast 
modeling skills and to develop and build capacity in the use of novel climate and crop prediction tools to enhance the quality of 
seasonal forecasts, and to tailor forecast information for agricultural decision-making.
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Moreover, the Regional Committee on Water Resources and CAC are working together to 
establish a regional technical agroclimatic committee. The financial and insurance sectors are 
also participating in the LTACs, which offers an important opportunity to inform the design and 
implementation of financial instruments and insurance programs that consider agroclimatic 
information. 
6.3 Integrated Agri-food System Initiatives in Mexico and Colombia
More integrated, research-based responses by public policy, agricultural value chains, and 
finance are often constrained by short-termism and zero sum thinking. In contrast, Maize 
for Mexico and Maize for Colombia represent structured efforts to build inter-disciplinary 
coalitions that make use of tools such as modelled predictions and scenarios, to synchronize 
public and private action at the national level toward sustainable and inclusive agri-food 
systems (Govaerts et al. 2021). The transformative resilience-building potential lies in the 
replicable approach to stakeholder engagement over time. Maize for Mexico (Govaerts et al. 
2019) is a joint institutional effort with more than 70 different stakeholders, while Maize for 
Colombia involves more than 30 different stakeholders. The two Integrated Agri-food System 
Initiatives (IASI)9 began with an assessment of business as usual, in which high uncertainty 
and low coordination prevented transformative investments. Using a systems lens, the IASI 
methodology develops scenarios based on available models and data to engage diverse 
stakeholders in design thinking.  
Maize for Mexico builds on the 10-year MasAgro program, to further scale out sustainable 
agriculture practices and enabling conditions. MasAgro had focused on improving value chains 
(e.g., farmers seized competitive opportunities to engage in local markets) and validating 
sustainable agriculture practices and their adoption and impact pathways. Farmers’ demands, 
interests and concerns were incorporated into a hub-based innovation model, through the 
interaction of organizations of agricultural producers, educational institutions, technology 
generators and agents of change. 
The Maize for Mexico five strategic lines of action promote productivity, improved risk 
management in value chains and representation of farmers’ interests via the 1) adoption of 
better seed varieties; 2) climate-smart agriculture systems; 3) technical assistance hubs for 
innovation; 4) access to markets and 5) an expanded partnership space with participatory 
tracking of progress. Implementation efforts rely on all involved value chain actors having 
access to key information that facilitates decision-making at every stage. A decision support 
system for small and medium-sized producers of maize, wheat, beans and other crops is being 
set up. An action and monitoring framework for private-public partnerships will incorporate 
inclusivity (small- and medium-sized farmers) and the above-mentioned innovations into the 
value chains.
9 Integrated approaches to agri-food system challenges draw upon a wide range of existing and emerging technologies, social 
change strategies, and policy tools, and financial investment.
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Crops for Mexico (of which Maize for Mexico is part) responds to the objectives stated in 
the National Development Plan 2019-2024 and focuses on food self-sufficiency and rural 
development. It is closely linked to government social programs, such as Production for 
Welfare, and Guarantee Prices and Mexican Food Security, to name a few. The governmental 
initiatives address several climate security-relevant challenges (Granados Martinez 2017), 
most urgently hunger, with three out of ten rural inhabitants not eating enough (Gobierno de 
México 2012). Taking a mid-term view to 2050, rising average temperature-induced impacts 
in the region may push up food insecurity and child malnutrition (Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee 2009). 
Investments in agri-food system innovation empower people to meet their own needs while 
participating in the wider economy, enabling stable, peaceful communities. Yet, Mexico’s 
Secretary of Agriculture and Rural Development warned in December 2020 that “for the first 
time in many years since Borlaug defeated hunger in Southeast Asia, millions of people are at 
risk of starvation in Africa, Asia and Latin America” (Curiel 2020). The Government of Mexico, 
together with the Nobel Peace Center and the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT), issued a joint call to action to overcome the main challenges to human 
development under pressure from conflict, organized crime, forced migration and climate 
change: #AgricultureForPeace.  CIMMYT’s host country has taken the next steps with the Crops 
for Mexico project, building on the 10-year MasAgro experience (2011-2021), whose model has 
earned recognition from several international development organizations, funding agencies 
and governments.
Colombia’s maize self-sufficiency stands at just 26%. By 2030, it may deteriorate to a production 
gap of up to 6.2 million tons. The Colombian National Agriculture Planning Office (UPRA for its 
acronym in Spanish) initiated this IASI process in June 2019. It involves a two-phase interaction 
with key maize value chain actors, resulting first in a policy guideline and action plan, based 
on a thorough situation analysis of the value chain; and secondly, the actors’ participatory 
validation of analyses, results and a draft Productive Management Plan of the Maize Chain 2022-
2041. The UPRA-led process was guided by IASI/Maize for Colombia methodology and tools, 
to address climate security-relevant challenges. There is a high future likelihood of having too 
much or too little water for agriculture (i.e., increased annual precipitation rate scenarios for 
the Andean and Pacific regions, whilst Orinoquia and Amazon region precipitation decreases) 
(Galeano et al. 2019) and, by 2030, maize production areas being no longer suitable, largely 
due to elevated temperatures, not precipitation10. 
The IASI methodology, as applied in Mexico and Colombia, has demonstrated its effectiveness 
in overcoming typical barriers and advancing multiple objectives simultaneously (e.g., 
improvement in crop yield and quality; farmer livelihoods; environmental protection). 
Progress made through a ”network-of-networks” approach builds connectivity and stability at 
every step. Action toward climate and food security in the Central American Dry Corridor can 
benefit from IASI-type participatory planning and innovation hub networks. 
10 By 2030, maize production will increase by 4.3% in the status quo, but the growth will not be significant considering the increase 
in the expected total demand for maize by 2030 (27.4%) in the same scenario, including both yellow maize (33.2%) and white 
maize (13.9%). (CIMMYT-CIAT, 2019).
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7. The Added Value of Agricultural Research for Development
This paper is part of a larger undertaking to articulate the role and value of Food Systems 
AR4D before, during and after conflicts: How can stakeholders achieve and benefit from 
peace dividends at the preventive, reactive and reconstruction stages? Can AR4D contribute 
perspectives, knowledge and solutions to national security research and policymaking? How 
can those solutions become complementary components to humanitarian, political, social 
and security-focused solutions to sustain rural livelihoods? 
CGIAR, for example, in its new One CGIAR strategy addresses the key SDGs of the Climate Security 
nexus, namely SDG2 on achieving Zero Hunger, SDG13 on Climate Action and SDG16 on Peace, 
Justice and Strong Institutions. CGIAR believes AR4D for land, water and food systems can 
contribute significantly to peace and security. Imagine for a moment that a well-coordinated 
development intervention succeeds in establishing inclusive governance from national to 
municipal level, much improved policing, functional social programs, and effective conflict 
resolution approaches. It also fosters renewable energy solutions and programs that enhance 
the skills of youth. But what about the knowledge and know-how required to sustainably live 
off and with the land under climate change, to continue contributing to national food, and 
nutritional security?  Adding this perspective, or layer, is what comprehensive climate security 
is about.
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The CGIAR Centers delivered research and enabled outcomes that also provided peace and 
security benefits, or spill-over effects, before the term climate security was coined. Examples 
include a 2013 study on Sudan’s vulnerable areas (Calderone, Maystadt, and You 2013) 
with particular biophysical characteristics and vulnerable populations; emergency seed 
multiplication in Ethiopia (CIMMYT 2016), and research on how forest-biomass is affected by 
armed-conflicts (Castro-Nunez et al. 2017). 
CGIAR Focus Climate Security has conducted a literature review on climate security to establish 
an overview of conflict drivers and pathways, serving as a base for mapping CGIAR and partner 
research in the context of climate security through a portfolio review (CGIAR FOCUS Climate 
Security n.d.). Conflict pathways, including drivers related to food systems, such as agricultural 
outputs, rural livelihoods, poverty and food insecurity, as well as migration and displacement 
and weak governance were among the most studied conflict drivers found in the literature. 
The same drivers are also most studied by CGIAR and addressed by conveying knowledge and 
tools on disaster-risk reduction, climate change adaptation and livelihood resilience, among 
others (Figure 10) (Liebig et al. 2021). 
Figure 10. Addressed drivers of conflict found in portfolio and literature review.
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8. Climate Security Entry Points for the Central American Dry 
Corridor 
To identify sensible entry points, it helps to take a national security experts’ (CNA 2007) 
perspective on destabilizing climate change impacts. They see reduced access to fresh water, 
impaired food production, health catastrophes, and land loss and flooding associated with 
displacement of major populations. The experts point to these security consequences: 
greater potential for failed states (and terrorism), mass migration adding to global tensions, 
and potential escalation of conflict over resources. This definition of climate security from 
a national security perspective matches well with the AR4D perspective: To understand the 
drivers behind human security consequences for rural agriculture-based communities facing 
changing climates and environmental degradation that affect food and nutrition security and 
their ability to manage a finite pool of natural resources (Maru et al. 2018; Olarinde et al. 2013).
Inclusive governance, functional social programs, effective conflict resolution approaches and 
highly skilled youth are critical assets but not enough to maintain climate security; it is equally 
important to understand how to use the land and its resources sustainably even in the face of 
growing climate stress.
In this paper we have shown that interconnected climate, security, and migration crises are 
being managed as separate challenges in the Central American Dry Corridor. Through well-
targeted support that complements humanitarian, political, social, and security-focused 
solutions, agricultural research for development can help rural populations adapt to and 
mitigate climate change impacts, stabilize agriculture-based livelihoods, and increase peace 
and security. 
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A spatial analysis of drivers of conflict demonstrated clearly that climate has the potential to 
exacerbate conflict, insecurity and migration. However, a social media and policy coherence 
analysis shows the disconnected discourses of climate and security both in public discourse 
and in policies. The analysis of peace, security and climate risk indicators situates the Central 
American Dry Corridor countries vis-a-vis other countries globally and uncovers the disconnect 
among the indicators in terms of climate security, human wellbeing, and peace. In this 
fragmented context, we have argued that investing in agriculture research for development 
can contribute to reducing conflict and out-migration, with its focus on enhancing resilience of 
agricultural production and rural livelihoods in response to climate change impacts.
We therefore propose the following entry point for incorporating climate security dimensions 
into rural development and regional and national security policy and research agendas:
1. Foster inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral dialogue to overcome currently siloed 
perspectives and develop a shared understanding of problems and agree on 
coordinated and joint actions. In many cases, inter-ministerial dialogue remains superficial 
(e.g., knowledge exchange versus joint learning and actions), budgets uncoordinated and 
national security institutions continue to act separately from each other and from research 
providers). A sensible starting point is to connect national mitigation and adaptation and 
security plans to related AR4D-identified rural opportunities and pathways, demonstrating 
what has worked where and documenting successful approaches for technology and 
process-know-how transfer from other countries or regions. This paper has shown that in 
Dry Corridor countries, there are currently no such discussions. Most actors, institutions 
and interest groups do not consider climate and security as critically linked and treat them 
as separate challenges.
2. Leverage existing efforts to bring together a range of partners to comprehensively 
quantify interrelated social, economic, and environmental challenges and business 
cases to target public and private sector investments, including in research. Climate 
security opportunity costs, externalities and rural development potential need to be 
assessed and inclusive business cases based on natural resource or environmental 
economic accounting built. In this paper, we have provided examples of externalities in the 
environmental, social and economic spheres that are interrelated (resource degradation 
and food insecurity leading to migration and conflicts).
3. Build on existing regional networks and knowledge transfer platforms to re-think 
and re-design community-based approaches that can effectively serve a range of 
interrelated objectives, including capacity development (e.g., the IASI framework). 
When taking a multi-sector and inter-generational view, one observes much fragmentation 
among rural education efforts. Focusing on agriculture, rural education and training is 
often project-driven (i.e., not institutionalized over a longer-term), delivering specific, 
oftentimes siloed, technology transfer (e.g., improved varieties and seeds, but not relevant 
farming practices). However, the sustainability of climate security solutions depends on 
the ability to manage train-the-trainer approaches over time (e.g., certified extension 
47Climate security in the Central American Dry Corridor
agent programs), build different kinds of business models (e.g., for ecosystem services, 
service providers, cooperatives), manage community networks, and perform advocacy 
and political dialogue (e.g., to improve enabling conditions). Such longer-term education 
programs could in future go hand-in-hand with currently unconnected One Health and 
conflict resolution/mediation training programs. This paper has featured several such 
approaches, including Local Technical Agroclimatic Committees, Climate-Smart Villages, 
MasAgro innovation hubs, that offer promise in the Central American Dry Corridor.
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